Epistemic possibilities are relative to bodies of information, or perspectives. To claim that something is epistemically possible is typically to claim that it is possible relative one's own current perspective. We generally do this by using bare, unqualified epistemic possibility (EP) sentences, ones that don't mention our perspective. The fact that epistemic possibilities are relative to perspectives suggests that these bare EP sentences fall short of fully expressing propositions, contrary to what both contextualists and relativists take for granted. Although they rightly reject propositional invariantism, the implausible view that a bare EP sentence expresses the same classical (absolutely true or absolutely false) proposition in any context, they maintain that a change in perspective shifts either the sentence's propositional content (to a proposition involving a different perspective) or its truth-value (the same perspectivally neutral proposition now evaluated from a different perspective). I deny that the semantic contents of bare EP sentences shift at all. But I also deny that these contents have truth-values. Rather, according to the radical invariantism I defend, these contents are not full-fledged propositions but merely propositional radicals. Only explicitly relativized EP sentences manage fully to express propositions, and these perspective-involving propositions are the only EP propositions there are. Nevertheless, bare EP sentences are perfectly capable of being used to assert EP propositions, because utterances of them implicitly allude to the relevant perspective. Various problem cases challenge radical invariantism to explain pragmatically which perspective is read into the utterance of a given bare EP sentence. Unlike contextualism and relativism, it can do this without having to resort to any semantic bells and whistles.
KENT BACH
There are many kinds of possibility: logical, metaphysical, nomological, physical, biological, technological, political -and epistemic. The focus here will be on epistemic possibilities and mainly on how we talk about them. 1 Epistemic possibilities typically arise whenever we ask a wh-question, such as "Where is it?" or "Whodunit?" They arise, for example, when one searches for misplaced glasses or when a detective tries to solve a murder case. Ideally, the different answers that come to mind exhaust the relevant epistemic possibilities. They also arise when, in contemplating a course of action, we consider the risks involved. That's why people carry an umbrella, buy auto insurance, or get a colonoscopy. Finally, they arise in connection with knowledge claims. We think we know something (or are tempted to draw a certain conclusion or to assert something), but then a counterpossibility occurs to us and we think again. Or someone else claims to know something and we object by way of raising a counterpossibility, something that if it obtained would directly contradict the claim in question or at least weigh against it.
Epistemic possibilities are relative, not absolute. They are relative to bodies of information, or perspectives. This perspective relativity gives rise to some interesting puzzles, about the language of epistemic possibility as well as epistemic possibility itself. 2 Our main question will be how to handle this relativity, especially in connection with sentences that do not make this relativity explicit. Compare these two sentences:
(1) Richard Branson might go to the moon by 2015.
(2) As far as Elton John knows, Richard Branson might go to the moon by 2015.
1 Note that this is not the sort of epistemic possibility that philosophers contrast with metaphysical possibility when they discuss identity statements. In that special, technical sense, something is epistemically possible, for example that Hesperus is distinct from Phosphorus, if its negation is not knowable a priori. 2 Perhaps not just epistemic possibility but other sorts of possibility are relative too. If so, then what distinguishes the different sorts is what the possibility is relative to. For example, whereas epistemic possibilities are relative to bodies of information, nomological possibilities are relative to sets of states of affairs and scientific laws. Accordingly, it might be argued that modal terms are not systematically ambiguous but semantically neutral as between different sorts of modality. What a given use is relativized to would determine which sort of modality is involved.
Let's call (1), which mentions no perspective, a bare EP sentence, in contrast to the relativized (2), which contains the phrase 'so far as Elton John knows '. 3 There are various other constructions that can be used to relativize an EP sentence, such as 'given what Elton John knows', 'relative to the information available to Elton John', and simply 'for Elton John'. Obviously, bare EP sentences lack something that relativized ones have -a mention of a perspective. This suggests to me that because epistemic possibility is perspective-relative, the semantic contents of bare EP sentences lack something as well.
The recent debate on their semantics has overlooked relativized EP sentences. Its almost exclusive focus on bare EP sentences, hence failure to compare them to their relativized counterparts, has confined the debate to a forced choice between two needlessly elaborate views, Contextualism and Relativism, which both impute dubious semantic roles to context. Implicitly accepting the grammar-school dictum that every sentence expresses a complete thought, proponents of both views take for granted that bare EP sentences semantically express propositions. 4 Rather than defend this assumption, they rely on intuitions about truth-values of utterances of such sentences.
And, because these truth-values seem to vary (even with all the facts fixed) depending on the context in which the utterance is made or considered, contextualists and relativists both reject Propositional Invariantism and maintain instead that bare EP sentences are context-sensitive. They disagree on just how: contextualists think that their semantic contents shift, and relativists think that their contents, though fixed, can still shift in truthvalue.
I will propose a simple, alternative view, one that has been overlooked because it abandons the assumption that bare EP sentences express propositions in the first place.
According to Radical Invariantism, as I call it, bare EP sentences are not contextsensitive in either of the ways claimed by contextualists and relativists. Rather, these sentences are propositionally incomplete: their invariant semantic contents are not fullfledged propositions but merely propositional radicals, which lack a constituent needed 3 Interestingly, replacing this phrase with 'for all Elton John knows' makes 'might' redundant. Even with 'will' in place of 'might', the sentence 'For all Elton John knows, Richard Branson will go to the moon by 2015' expresses epistemic possibility. 4 From now on, I will usually use 'express' rather than 'semantically express' when talking about sentences (as opposed to speakers). I think 'semantically express' is redundant in that case, but I will occasionally use it anyway, just for emphasis. I call what a sentence expresses its semantic content, but note that sentences containing indexicals can have different semantic contents (express different things) in different contexts.
for being true or false. By distinguishing propositional incompleteness from context sensitivity, Radical Invariantism does not have to resort to semantic bells and whistles, as both Contextualism and Relativism do. It does not need to lavish special powers on context or introduce propositions with special semantic properties.
Radical Invariantism agrees with Contextualism that there are only classical EP propositions, ones that are absolutely true or absolutely false, but it denies that bare EP sentences manage to express them, even in context. And it agrees with Relativism that bare EP sentences do not express different EP propositions in different contexts, but only because it denies that they express propositions at all. What relativists think of as relative propositions are really, depending on whether we are considering objects of thought or semantic contents of bare EP sentences, either underspecified classical propositions or propositional radicals. Radical Invariantism says that bare EP sentences leave a certain semantic slack.
It is a separate question how speakers who use and encounter these sentences manage to pick up the slack. Although Contextualism and Relativism both offer insights about the statements we make in using the language of epistemic possibility, accounting for the contents of such statements and our evaluations of them as true or false is a job that goes well beyond accounting for the semantics of the sentences themselves. 5 The intuitions about truth-values on which contextualists and relativists base their semantics of bare EP sentences are responsive not to the semantic contents of these sentences but to the propositions we have in mind or those that come to mind when we use or hear these sentences. Epistemic possibilities are perspective-relative, but bare EP sentences do not mention or otherwise advert to perspectives, not even implicitly. So, I claim, these sentences lack truth-values, even relative to contexts. Even so, what a speaker means when using a bare EP sentence can and generally does involve a perspective, one that he could have mentioned explicitly if he had needed to, by using a relativized rather than a bare EP sentence. This suggests that there is nothing special about the semantic contents of bare EP sentences but something lacking in them. 5 Putting an excessive burden on the semantics leads inevitably to great complications, as illustrated by the ingenious and highly sophisticated theories recently developed by Tamina Stephenson (2007) and by Seth Yalcin (2007) .
In the first three sections, I will distinguish propositions about epistemic possibilities from epistemic possibilities themselves, contrast different conceptions of the relativity of epistemic possibility, and make some observations about the language of epistemic possibility. In the next three sections, I clarify the differences between the three approaches to be discussed, illustrate the basic kinds of problem cases that have motivated Contextualism and Relativism, and then present some less familiar problem cases. I will explain how, and how well, each approach handles each case. In the next two sections I will identify some general difficulties first for Relativism and then for Contextualism, ones that go beyond their trouble handling specific cases. Finally, I will identify and respond to the best objections to Radical Invariantism that I can think of.
Epistemic Possibilities and EP Propositions
Just as a chair cannot be comfortable without being comfortable for someone, so a state of affairs cannot be epistemically possible without being epistemically possible for someone. 6 Being epistemically possible is a relation, and being epistemically possible for someone is a relational property of a state of affairs, just as being comfortable to someone is a relational property of a piece of furniture or an article of clothing. We might say that a state of affairs is epistemically possible for someone at a time if it is not ruled out by the information available to that person at that time. 7 A person's current body of information, or perspective, determines which states of affairs are epistemically possible for him at the time. So we can think of a state of affairs as possible either relative to a person at a time or relative to a perspective. In some cases the relevant perspective is not a particular person's but that of a group.
Importantly, something can be epistemically possible for someone at a time even if the person does not believe that it is (you can mistakenly believe that your knowledge rules out something that it does not). And a person can believe that something is epistemically possible for them even if it is not (you can overlook a relevant part of what you know). Being epistemically possible for someone is distinct from seeming epistemically possible to someone. 6 As I am using 'state of affairs', some states of affairs obtain, and some do not. 7 There are different ways of construing this, as we will see in section 2.
An epistemic possibility is one thing; an epistemic possibility proposition is another. This last observation points to one obvious difference between using a bare EP sentence such as (1) rather than a relativized one like (2):
Common to both sentences is what we might call the core proposition, here the proposition that Richard Branson will go to the moon by 2015. It represents the state of affairs of Branson going to the moon by 2015, whose possibility both (1) and (2) can be used to assert. But whereas (2) can be used only to assert this possibility relative to Elton John's perspective, (1) can be used to assert it relative to anyone's perspective. Normally, but as we will see not always, this is (or includes) the speaker's perspective. That and related facts about sentences like (1) has led some to suggest that context somehow "determines" or "provides" the relevant relativization. accepting an epistemic possibility. We can say that one accepts a certain epistemic possibility if, relative to one's perspective at the time, one believes that the state of affairs in question is epistemically possible. This allows that one can go from accepting to rejecting a certain epistemic possibility without going from believing to disbelieving some one epistemic possibility proposition. By the same token, it allows that two people can in some sense disagree about a certain epistemic possibility even if there is no particular epistemic possibility proposition that one believes and the other disbelieves.
The Perspective Relativity of Epistemic Possibilities
In everyday conversation we raise, examine, dispute, and ultimately accept or reject epistemic possibilities. The same thing happens in more formal situations, such as investigations, trials, and debates. Some possibilities are left open -they're "live" possibilities -and some are eliminated or closed. Some are summarily dismissed, some are just overlooked, and some are looked into. Epistemic possibilities come in degreeswe describe them variously as likely, strong, good, significant, realistic, reasonable, moderate, slight, insignificant, remote, idle, and far-fetched. It is not obvious that these reduce to degrees of probability, subjective or otherwise. how we talk about epistemic possibility will apply just as well to evidential and to doxastic possibility, insofar as we ordinarily distinguish these.
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Assuming the relevant sort of information is knowledge, we can say that to be (epistemically) possible a state of affairs must be compatible with a certain body of knowledge. But whose body of knowledge? One's own, someone else's, a group's, a discipline's, all of humanity's? It seems to me that these are all perfectly good answers.
Epistemic possibility is relative. We can pick any body of knowledge -individual, collective, past, present, or future, or even hypothetical, and say that a given state of affairs is compatible with it, hence epistemically possible relative to it. In particular, a 8 The distinction between evidential and epistemic possibility obviously presupposes that evidence is not limited to knowledge. This conflicts with Tim Willliamson's well known but controversial "E = K" doctrine (2000: ch. 9). 9 I suspect that this may explain, in least in part, the variability and shiftiness of people's intuitions about the truth-values of statements made using bare EP sentences. 10 One point made earlier applies to all three: something can be possible (epistemically, evidentially, or doxastically, as the case may be) for you even if you do not believe that it is (with doxastic possibility this is true only up to a point, for if a person believes that something is not doxastically possible for him, then it is not -by virtue of that very belief and not to another, and nothing is epistemically possible except relative to a perspective.
In this respect, being epistemically possible is like being obvious, being surprising, and being puzzling: nothing can be obvious, surprising, or puzzling simpliciter.
Perspectives and Bare Epistemic Possibility Sentences
Various expressions can be used to express epistemic possibility, such as the modals 'might', 'could', and 'may' and the adverbs 'possibly', 'perhaps' and 'maybe'. 12 We can also use locutions like 'it is possible that', 'for all I know', and 'there's a chance that'.
13
Most of our examples will use 'might'. Even though epistemic possibilities are relative to perspectives, in asserting a possibility we generally do not need to make the perspective explicit, usually because it is our own. Generally we can (and do) use bare, unqualified EP sentences instead. But sometimes we have to make explicit what the relevant perspective is and use a sentence like one of these:
(3) As far as Jack knows, Jill might still be on the hill.
(4) According to Jill's preliminary diagnosis, Jack might have a concussion.
(5) Given the information currently available to the local authorities, the fire might have been caused by lightning.
Making the perspective explicit is necessary whenever it would not otherwise be evident
to our audience what perspective is the relevant one. In assertively uttering sentences like (3) - (5) we do not commit ourselves one way or the other about the relevant possibility, that is, from our own perspective. We are asserting the possibility relative to another 12 'Perhaps' and 'maybe' are special cases (for this reason I will not discuss them in this paper). For one thing, not only can they be used to express epistemic possibility they can also be used to indicate that one is suggesting the core proposition -or just guessing. They are then being used as utterance modifiers, to comment on the act the utterance rather than to modify its content. For a discussion of utterance modifiers and a taxonomy of them, see Bach 1999: 356-60 . 13 This use of 'There's a chance that' does not imply that epistemic possibility is reducible to probability. This idiomatic use does not mean 1 chance in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in 1,000,000, or anything of the sort. And surely being epistemically possible is not just having a (subjective) probability greater than zero.
perspective. For example, an arsonist might utter (5) knowing full well that the core proposition is false.
When we do not make the perspective explicit, typically our own perspective is the relevant one, as in a likely utterance of (6).
(6) The front door might be unlocked.
However, our own perspective can and often does incorporate our audience's, insofar as we take for granted that their knowledge does not rule out the possibility in question.
Sometimes the relevant perspective is that of a uniquely salient group of which we are a member or to which we defer, but some stage setting may be necessary for this to be understood, as in the following examples.
(7) The fire might be the result of arson.
(8) String theory might never be verified.
Suppose that the chief of the local fire department utters (7). He would intend, and could reasonably expect, to be taken as speaking from the department's perspective. And if I, having no expertise on string theory, were the speaker of (8), I could well be deferring to the perspective of the physics profession. At any rate, typical uses of bare EP sentences are, we might say, egocentric or at least ego-inclusive, depending on whether the relevant perspective is strictly one's own or incorporates a larger perspective to which one as it were subscribes. This could be a perspective one is presumed to share with one's audience or it could be the perspective of a uniquely salient larger group to whose authority on the matter one defers.
In special circumstances bare EP sentences can be used to assert that something is epistemically possible from a perspective disjoint from one's own. This is clearest when they are embedded in attitude attributions or are used to explain actions:
(9) Anne thinks that Andy might be in Anchorage.
(10) Ben called Betty because she might have Bertha's phone number.
In (9) the relevant perspective is Anne's, not the speaker's, since it is her attitude that is being reported. In (10) the relevant perspective is Ben's, because it is his action that is being explained. But when there is no such indication, as with (6) above, speakers are likely to be taking their own perspectives. The situation with 'might' is roughly analogous to that with such terms as 'nearby' and 'fun'. If I uttered (11) or (12), for example, normally I would be speaking from my own point of view.
(11) There is a gym nearby.
(12) Working out on an elliptical trainer will be fun.
In some situations, however, someone else's perspective would be understood. If the person were speaking to sister on the phone, he would be telling her that a gym is near her, not him. And if he hated exercise, presumably he would be suggesting that working out on an elliptical trainer will be fun for her, not him.
Contextualism, Relativism, or What?
The relativity of epistemic possibility has led to the widespread impression that there (1) and (2) again.
(2) mentions a perspective; (1) (2005), although they forthrightly acknowledge that Relativism is not without problems of its own, proceed by arguing against "invariantist solutions," which they assume without argument to be propositional, and "contextualist solutions." (Lasersohn (2005) , in his defense of a kind of relativism about unrelativized sentences containing predicates of personal taste, proceeds in part by arguing against propositional invariantist and contextualist views.) MacFarlane's case for Relativism also depends on this line of argument. He does consider "non-truth-conditional approaches," but only those that treat epistemic modals as "force modifiers" (this volume, section 4).
propositional content. Its content does not add up to a proposition, and is neither true nor false. On this view, radical rather than propositional invariantism, bare EP sentences are propositionally incomplete: their invariant semantic contents are not propositions but merely propositional radicals. These notions are straightforward if you think in terms of (structured) propositions rather than truth conditions. Since structured propositions are made up of building blocks assembled in a particular way, it makes sense to suppose that with some (in fact many) sentences this assemblage, put together compositionally from the sentence's constituents according to its syntactic structure, might fail to comprise a proposition (numerous examples are presented in Bach 1994) . Even though it comprises the entire semantic content of the sentence, this propositional radical lacks at least one constituent needed to be true or false and to be the content of a thought or a statement.
Although bare EP sentences semantically do not express full-fledged propositions, hence are not capable of being true or false, they are perfectly capable of being used to assert propositions and of being taken as so used. In that case, the speaker implicitly adverts to the perspective with respect to which the relevant possibility is to be considered. But bare EP sentences, unlike relativized ones, do not themselves express propositions. From the radical invariantist standpoint, both contextualists and relativists commit the Proposition Fallacy: they assume that if a sentence, with all of its constituents being used literally, can be used to convey a proposition, the sentence itself must express one. conclude, to be semantic theses Contextualism and Relativism must be construed as concerning the semantic contents of bare EP sentences.
One preliminary point in favor of Radical Invariantism is that although terms like 'might' and 'possible' apply not just to epistemic possibility but also and to other kinds, such as logical, metaphysical, nomological, physical, biological, technological, and legal possibility, this does not make these terms semantically ambiguous. That is, the fact that there are various sorts of possibility does not show that 'possibility' -or 'might' or 'possible' -has various meanings. This fact strongly suggests that perspective relativity is not built into the semantics of these terms. Sentences containing such terms can just as well be relativized to, for example, physical laws or legal codes.
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Whether or not this point counts for much, the more pressing question is how well the different views -Contextualism, Relativism, and Radical Invariantism -handle a wide range of cases. I will compare them on this score in the next two sections, where we will first take up some basic examples and then some trickier cases.
Shifting Perspectives: Basic Examples
Contextualism and Relativism are each motivated by intuitions about the truth-values of ostensibly conflicting possibility claims made or considered in various situations. Three basic types of case have been discussed in the literature. In the first case, one person asserts a certain possibility and is overheard by someone else who knows that this 20 The qualification 'relative to contexts of use' allows for the case of sentences containing indexicals to have truth-conditional but context-relative semantic contents. 21 It won't help to invoke sentence tokens, as if these have autonomous semantic properties. In my view, token semantics is, well, token semantics. 22 The adverbs 'maybe' and 'perhaps' are exceptions, being used only for epistemic possibility.
possibility doesn't obtain. The second is a case of direct disagreement between two people about a certain possibility. In the third case, a person accepts a certain possibility and then changes his mind about it. In each case there is a tendency to think that there are two conflicting claims and yet that they are both correct. The puzzle is to explain how this can be -or to explain it away. In this section I will present illustrations of each case, sketch contextualist, relativist, and radical invariantist accounts of the variable role of perspective in each case, and identify certain difficulties and complications for each. in which case the disagreement clearly is genuine. This is the situation when, for example, two people engaged in an inquiry share all relevant information (or treat it is shared). In that case, clearly they can genuinely disagree on whether this information leaves open or excludes a given possibility. For instance, two radiologists with the same knowledge and expertise can disagree on whether a certain shadow they both see on an X-ray might be the image of a tumor. 24 However, in the next two cases there is a definite difference in perspective, and this difference contributes to the "disagreement." I use scare quotes because part of what is at issue here is whether the disagreement is genuine, that is, whether there is some one proposition that the two parties are disagreeing about. 23 Some of the problems I mention with contextualist treatments of particular examples are similar to those pointed out by Egan, Hawthorne, and Weatherson (2005: 135-44) and by MacFarlane (this volume, sections 2 and 3). And some of the problems I mention with relativist treatments of particular examples are similar to those pointed out by Wright (2007) perspective, but it denies that this semantic content amounts to a proposition of any kind.
On the other hand, Radical Invariantism agrees with Contextualism that perspectives enter into the propositions speakers have in mind when using or hearing sentences like (13). Radical Invariantism is thus forced to concede that the proposition that my wife entertained upon hearing me mutter (13) is not the one that I had in mind when I muttered it. So she and I do not disagree. Rather, we are taking opposite stances toward different propositions, just as the Contextualist says.
Is this a fatal objection to Radical Invariantism (and to Contextualism)? Not quite.
Both views can at least pay lip service to Relativism in the following way. Even though my wife and I did not disagree about any (relevant) proposition, we do "disagree" about the relevant possibility. I accept it and she rejects it, relative to our respective perspectives. I thought that the state of affairs of my keys being out on the sidewalk was possible (relative to my perspective), while she thought that it was not possible (relative to hers). This "disagreement" is not genuine -it is not about any one proposition -but it can seem genuine because no perspective is mentioned. That makes it seem as though my wife and I disagree about some one thing. It explains why I would look for them out on the sidewalk and she would not.
"Disagreement" II: Disputing
In that relative to KB and CB's joint perspective, the keys might be out on the sidewalk. Of course she and I were not explicitly thinking about this proposition in these terms.
Nonetheless, as Radical Invariantism has it, that was the proposition we were both considering. It is only after we recognized that our perspectives diverged and I retreated into mine and she maintained hers that we came to entertain different perspectiveinvolving propositions. But at least, even after this realization, we were at least "disagreeing" about the same possibility.
Changing Your Mind
We often go from accepting to rejecting a possibility -we consider it, accept it, but then look into it further and eliminate it. For example, early in a murder investigation a detective is disposed to utter (16) but later, after confirming the butler's alibi, he's ready to take it back and to go with its negation (17) The contextualist take on this is that even though sentence (17) is the negative version of (16), they do not express contradictory propositions. (16) and (17) Earlier he correctly believed that such a possibility was compatible with his then current body of information, and later he correctly believed that it was incompatible with his now current body of information. Moreover, whether he (or we) realize it or not, he still believes that this possibility is compatible with his earlier body of information -he hasn't changed his mind about that. He is just longer concerned with that proposition, with what was possible for him when he was less informed.
Relativism views the detective's situation very differently. It claims that (16) expresses the same (non-classical, perspectivally neutral) proposition later as it did earlier, and that this is the proposition the detective first accepts and later rejects, from his different perspectives. So he is now rejecting the right proposition, and he is right to reject it. And, in thinking he was wrong earlier, he is right about which proposition he is now rejecting. However, there is still a problem here for Relativism. In thinking he was wrong earlier, he does not believe that he was wrong earlier to believe that proposition from his perspective now, since he wasn't in that perspective then. On the other hand, if he thought he was mistaken in believing that proposition from his earlier perspective, he'd be wrong about that! After all, according to Relativism, at the later time he is constrained to evaluate that proposition as false. Of course, he can readily evaluate as true the classical, perspective-involving proposition that relative to his earlier perspective the butler could have done it. However, this is not the perspectivally neutral proposition the relativist needs. So it seems that Relativism is hard put to capture, in relativist terms, what it is that the detective rightly thinks he was wrong about.
Relativism seem to render the consideration of a relative proposition context-bound.
In the case of the detective, it seems to reckon him no longer able to occupy the cognitive position he was in earlier. Is this enough to explain why he is right to say he was wrong before, or at least why we feel some inclination to think so? It seems that we also need an explanation of why he
is confused about what he was wrong about. Surely he was not mistaken earlier because he accepted a possibility that would be excluded by his later perspective. Yet that seems to be why he now thinks he was wrong then and why it is natural to describe him as having changed his mind. It is not just that he would no longer assertively utter a sentence he was prepared to use then. accepting to rejecting a possibility and concede that we were wrong before, our attention is misdirected from the proposition we previously believed to the one that we now reject, a proposition that we can now convey with the same sentence.
I concede, then, that Radical Invariantism is committed to a kind of error theory here.
The detective is confused about what he was wrong about, though right about which sentence it is that he would no longer use. But he is right about more than that. He is also right about the epistemic possibility that he previously accepted. Now that he has ruled it out, presumably correctly, it is no longer the open possibility that it was. But since earlier it was open, in that respect he is wrong to think now that he was wrong then.
New Evidence, Same Possibility
The case of Changing Your Mind should not divert our attention from an even simpler case, one that tends to be overlooked in the literature on epistemic possibility. This is the Although Contextualism and Radical Invariantism differ as to whether sentence (16), as used on either occasion, manages to express a (perspective-involving) proposition, they agree that in using it on those two occasions the detective would be asserting two different things, each involving his perspective at the time. After he gathers additional evidence, he believes something he didn't believe before. He may continue to believe 30 Notice that I don't say "continues to believe that" because I do not want to assume that he continues to believe the same thing. In this regard, I am not assuming that the 'that'-clause of a true belief attribution must fully specify something that the subject believes. In my view, identical 'that'-clauses of two different true belief attributions can partially specify two different beliefs. See Bach 1997. what he believed before (that, relative to his earlier perspective, the butler could have done it), but this is not the belief he expresses in making the later assertion. According to the Relativist, on the other hand, the detective believes the same thing all along, that the butler could have done it, but this non-classical proposition is first true relative to his earlier perspective and later true relative to his later perspective.
Relativism captures the natural intuition that the detective continues to believe the same thing, but it is hard put to explain just how the detective can rightly say that he was right all along (just as in Changing Your Mind it is hard put to explain how the detective can rightly say that he was wrong earlier). To be sure, he continues to believe the same thing, but he does so from a different perspective. Again, Relativism is faced with the problem of perspectival solipsism -it cannot readily explain how one can consider a given perspectivally neutral EP proposition from different perspectives. Whenever another perspective is involved, Relativism seems forced to change the subject to perspective-involving propositions. And this raises the question whether perspectivally neutral propositions are needed after all.
Perhaps that is not as serious a problem as that facing Contextualism and Radical
Invariantism, which have the detective believing two different things, one before and another after gathering additional evidence. Indeed, both these views seem to make it difficult to verify an EP proposition. For as soon as one gathers additional evidence for a given epistemic possibility, one ends up verifying a new perspective-involving Something similar happens in when a teacher asks a student a question about an overlooked possibility. Suppose you are teaching chess and your student is trying to find the best move in a certain position. The student proposes what is in fact the best move and gives some analysis to back it up, but he has overlooked a plausible but unsound sacrificial reply. So you say "What about the knight sac on e6?" or, less colloquially, (21) Sacrificing the knight on e6 might be good for White.
Since you see the refutation of that move, you don't mean that as far as you know the knight sac might be good. Rather, you mean that as far as the student knows the knight sac might be good. Here the relativist would say that what you suggested is that the knight sac might be good, which though not true relative to your perspective, is true relative to the student's.
In these two examples, it seems that what the speaker means is true, even though the mentioned states of affairs are not possible relative to his perspective. So the relevant perspective cannot be the speaker's. If it were, then, given the speaker's evident authority on the subject matter, the hearer could infer that the core propositions are true (that the ball is under a cushion or that the knight sac is good), which obviously is not intended. In these cases, clearly the hearer's perspective is the relevant one.
These cases pose a problem for both Contextualism and Relativism. Whether what the speaker means is a proposition involving the hearer's perspective, as Contextualism has it, or is a perspectivally neutral proposition, as on Relativism, these views need to explain how, as a matter of semantic fact, it is specifically the hearer's perspective that figures in and why it is neither the speaker's nor an arbitrary eavesdropper's. For there is nothing special about the sentences: (20) and (21) 
Asking about a Possibility
This case of poses a little puzzle. Often when we are curious or concerned about something, we naturally ask someone who is more informed about it than we are. Even if they are not in a position to resolve the issue, we can still ask them about the possibilities. Here's the little puzzle. If you asking about this possibility, presumably it is not ruled out by the information you already have. So it is possible for you that you have lung cancer.
But, then, why are you asking the question? It seems that you are asking a question to which you already know the answer! This is not like the case of the teacher asking a question to mention a possibility to a student, where the teacher's own information already rules out that possibility. You ask the doctor not because you want to see if she knows the answer but because you yourself want to know it. But it seems that you already do. So why ask?
There must be a simple solution to this little puzzle, having something to do with the fact that you do not know the answer relative to the superior information available to the person you are asking. Obviously, the pulmonary specialist, with her expertise and the information she gains by examining you, is in a much better epistemic position than you to assess your medical condition. Although you know that further tests would be needed to determine if you actually do have lung cancer, you are confident that the examination is providing her with information that could definitively rule out that possibility.
Radical Invariantism, when augmented with simple pragmatic considerations, seems best able to give a straightforward account of what is going on in this case. The patient is asking the doctor whether it is possible, relative to the doctor's body of information, that the patient has lung cancer. Contextualism and Relativism might try to explain the irrelevance of the speaker's perspective on the grounds that the speaker knows less than the hearer. 32 However, this is not a necessary condition for asking a question about a possibility. Here is a case in which the speaker knows more. A lawyer challenges a witness's testimony by asking, "Isn't it possible that you saw the defendant's twin brother, not the defendant himself?" Even though the questioner knows more (the lawyer knows perfectly well that her client, not his twin brother, was at the scene of the crime), the perspective that figures in here is that of the person being asked, not the questioner's.
Attitude Reports
When we ascribe beliefs or other attitudes about possibilities to other people and use bare EP sentences in the 'that'-clause of the ascription, normally the relevant perspective is that of the person we're talking about, as in (23). (23 Here the content of the ascribed belief is explicitly a perspective-involving proposition.
The relativist will insist that both Contextualism and Radical Invariantism mischaracterize the content of the belief ascribed by a speaker of (23). Because (23) mentions no perspective, no perspective is included in its content. The relativist needs a way for the reporter's perspective to stay out of the picture so that the reporter can endorse this perspectivally neutral proposition from the agent's perspective (as opposed to endorsing the perspective-involving proposition that has the agent's perspective as a constituent).
Action Explanation
Even without being embedded, a bare EP sentence can be used to explain an action. For example, a visitor asks my wife why I briefly went outside, and she replies with (27), (27) He might have left the keys in the front door.
What matters here is my perspective, not hers. Having just come in through the front door, she might know full well that the keys can't be there. So her perspective doesn't matter. Indeed, she could have gone further and replied with the factive (28), (28) He realized that he might have left the keys in the front door.
As we just saw, this doesn't commit her to believing that from her perspective I might have left the keys in the front door.
It might be objected regarding (27), where the bare EP sentence is not embedded, that there is no commitment to the relevant perspective-involving proposition; my wife is committed only to the fact that I thought that I might have left the keys in the front door.
However, this objection, if valid, would show too much. We frequently explain people's actions in terms of facts they are aware of. For example, my wife could explain why I shut off the stove by saying, "The water was boiling." She does not have to hedge her explanation by saying, "He thought the water was boiling." Of course, if the whistling I heard were not that of the teakettle, then this explanation would be incorrect. But it doesn't follow that it is actually incorrect. What's more, to shift to the attitude attributing form is to shift from a reasons explanation to a causal explanation. My reason for turning off the stove was that the water was boiling, not that I thought it was boiling.
Temporal Modification
It seems that temporal modifiers that occur in bare EP sentences with 'might' and 'possible' generally take narrow scope even when they occur outside the EP term.
Consider (29), for example:
(29) Yesterday Barry might have been in New York.
An utterance of (29) would seem to concern where Barry might have been the previous day, not whether on that day it was possible that he was there. It is more plausibly read as saying that Barry might have been in New York yesterday. However, the situation is less clear with (30), which contains two tense markers.
(30) Yesterday it was possible that Barry was in New York.
The preferred reading of (30) seems to be that it was possible yesterday (even if not today) that Barry was in New York (presumably yesterday but perhaps at some earlier time). Indeed, it does not seem that (30) has a reading according to which it is now possible that Barry was in New York yesterday. For that we need (31), which has 'is' in place of the first 'was' in (30):
(31) It is possible that Barry was in New York yesterday.
Even so, I am not suggesting that the preferred reading of (30) This point is clearer in cases where the state of affairs in question is atemporal, as here:
(33) Twenty years ago it was possible that Fermat's Last Theorem was false.
In this case, the temporal modification cannot plausibly be taken to bear on the time at which Fermat's Last Theorem was false. Indeed, even someone who thinks that a mathematical claim can change truth-value over time would need to use (34), not (33), to mean that Fermat's Last Theorem might have been false twenty years earlier.
(34) It is possible that Fermat's Last Theorem was false twenty years ago.
So it seems that with their two tense markers temporally modified 'it was possible' sentences, such as (30) and (33), concern the time of the perspective, not the time of the state of affairs, whereas temporally modified single clause 'might' sentences, such as (30), concern the time of the state of affairs.
These brief observations are provisional. The subject of temporally modified bare EP sentences is much too complicated to discuss here in detail. Unfortunately, the in-depth bare and relativized EP sentences. For now I can only speculate that wherever there is a puzzle involving tense or temporal modification in bare EP sentences, the puzzle probably arises because despite there being an indication of the time of the relevant perspective there is no indication of whose perspective it is. This just goes to show that if you wish to assert that something was possible relative to a certain perspective at a certain time, you need to indicate, as in (32), the perspective as well as the time.
General Problems for Relativism
Contextualism and Relativism are subject to problems that go beyond their difficulties at handling particular cases. These concern their underlying assumptions and the philosophical motivations behind them. I will discuss problems with Relativism first, because of its appeal to nonclassical perspectivally neutral propositions. In the next section I will turn to some basic problems for Contextualism.
Relativists rarely mention, much less discuss, relativized EP sentences and their semantic contents. Even so, I think it is safe to assume that relativists do not deny that these sentences semantically express perspective-involving EP propositions, classical
propositions true or false independently of the context in which they are conveyed or considered. What relativists claim is that there are perspectivally neutral EP propositions as well, that these are nonclassical, relative propositions, and that bare EP sentences express them. This view gives rise to several problems. One concerns the relativist conception of propositions in general, and several are specific to the relativist account of bare EP sentences. I will touch only briefly on the general worry about the relativist's propositions, since it is not specific to the semantics of bare EP sentences. A question specific to them is whether, in order to make sense of our uses of bare EP sentences and of the semantic contents of the sentences themselves, there is any need to invoke perspectivally neutral propositions in the first place.
The relativist's non-classical propositions are supposed to be true or false relative to or from a perspective, so that such a proposition could be true from one perspective and false from another. The following example suggests a problem with that. 33 Suppose that the (putative) proposition in question is that Central Park might be larger than Golden Gate Park. Suppose Rudy figures that since New York is so much bigger than San 33 There is also at least a terminological problem with the relativist notion of assessment sensitivity. MacFarlane describes epistemic modal terms (and expressions of certain other types, such as predicates of personal taste) as "assessment-sensitive," but this is misleading. For it is not the assessment but the context of assessment to which the truth of a relative EP proposition is supposed to be relative. What matters is not whether the agent assesses this proposition as true or false but that the agent possesses a certain body of knowledge (information, evidence) relative to which this proposition is true or false. MacFarlane seems to use 'true at a context of assessment' interchangeably with 'true as assessed from a context of assessment' (this volume: n23), but, so far as I can tell, the assessing itself plays no role in his account.
Francisco, its most famous park could well be bigger too. Meanwhile, I know for a fact that Golden Gate Park is more than 20% larger in area than Central Park. Now the relativist view is that there is one proposition, that Central Park might be larger than Golden Gate Park, which is true relative to Rudy's perspective and false relative to mine.
But what is such a proposition? Offhand it would seem that a proposition corresponds to a possible or conceivable way the world is. That is, the proposition is true just in case the world is as the proposition says it is. This view of propositions is not preserved on the relativist conception. If it were, the world could be one way from Rudy's perspective and another way relative to mine. 34 Of course the world could seem different from our respective perspectives, but obviously that is not the relativist's point. Nor is it that being possible from Rudy's perspective is compatible with not being possible from mine. These are two different relational properties that a state of affairs (such as Central Park being larger than Golden Gate Park) could have, as ascribed by different perspective-involving EP propositions. The relativist claim is that one and the same proposition (that Central Park might be larger than Golden Gate Park) could be true relative to Rudy's perspective and false relative to mine.
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From the standpoint of Radical Invariantism, the propositions posited by Relativism amount to no more than propositional radicals, if considered as the semantic contents of bare EP sentences, or partially specified classical propositions, if considered as contents of thoughts about epistemic possibilities. I think it is fair to regard this as the default hypothesis about them. To show that this hypothesis is inadequate, the relativist needs to show that perspectivally neutral EP propositions play an indispensable role in our talk about epistemic possibility. For example, he needs to argue that people can disagree and change their minds about epistemic possibilities in a way that attributing classical propositional contents to our attitudes cannot make sense of. Because they have restricted their attention to bare EP sentences, it has not occurred to relativists to do this. 34 Worth noting here is what Michael Glanzberg (forthcoming) calls "the easy road to relativism," the argument that since truth is relative to a world anyway, there is no principled roadblock to extending its relativization to other parameters, such as perspectives. Glanzberg argues that, contrary to popular opinion, relativization of truth to worlds plays no essential role in semantic theory and plays merely a heuristic role in meta-theory. 35 This and related problems are brought out more fully by Crispin Wright (forthcoming). Wright and also Paul Boghossian (2006) , in the course of discussing various sorts of relativism, register their doubts as to whether truth relativism in a given area can amount to anything more than property relativism in that area.
The burden on the relativist is to show that what he regards as the truth of a perspectivally neutral EP proposition relative to a given perspective amounts to something other than the truth of a classical EP proposition that involves that perspective.
To show this it is not enough to point out that two people who both think that possibly p, their different perspectives notwithstanding, must have something in common. For that does not show that they believe the same thing. It shows only that they believe something of the same sort and to that extent have a belief property in common. Surely it does not follow from the fact that two people love their mother that they love the same person.
Even so, they share the property of loving their (respective) mothers. Similarly, the mere fact that two people could use the same bare EP sentence to convey their respective beliefs does not show, even if the sentence has invariant semantic content, that they believe the same thing. Even if they share the property of accepting the same epistemic possibility, it does not follow that they believe the same EP proposition.
Another challenge for Relativism is show that its account of bare EP sentences coheres with the semantics of relativized EP sentences, which express perspectiveinvolving EP propositions. Such a proposition says that a certain state of affairs is possible relative to a certain perspective. So if a bare EP sentence expresses all but a perspective, the simple (perhaps naïve) conclusion to draw is that it falls short of expressing a full-fledged EP proposition -it seems to lack an essential ingredient. To rebut this simple conclusion the relativist needs to explain how and why the semantic content of a bare EP sentence amounts to anything more than an underspecified content of any corresponding relativized EP sentence. And it must explain this in such a way that expressions like 'might' and 'possible' have the same meanings regardless of which sort of sentence they occur in.
Finally, there is our earlier worry that Relativism seems to lead to a certain perspectival solipsism: one can consider a perspectivally neutral EP proposition only from one's current perspective, not from an earlier perspective, much less from anyone else's, past or present. To consider an EP proposition relative to an earlier or another's perspective is just to consider a relativized EP proposition involving that perspectiveone can't consider a perspectivally neutral EP proposition (if there is such a thing) from any but one's current perspective. All this makes one wonder whether what one believes from one's current perspective isn't a just classical EP proposition involving that perspective.
General Problems for Contextualism
Contextualism and Radical Invariantism agree that all EP propositions involve perspectives, propositions that are absolutely true or false and are expressed (invariantly)
by relativized EP sentences (given that any and all indexical, including time, references are fixed). But Contextualism maintains that they can also be expressed by bare EP sentences, though which such proposition a given bare EP sentence expresses depends on the context in which it is used. The semantic content of a given bare EP sentence as used in a given context involves a perspective, which is somehow provided or otherwise determined by that context. The question is whether there is any good reason to suppose this.
From the standpoint of Radical Invariantism, it is gratuitous to attribute complete propositional contents, however variable, to bare EP sentences just on the basis of intuitions of truth or falsity. That just takes for granted that these intuitions pertain to the sentences themselves. 36 The mere fact that we can convey propositions when we use them and grasp propositions when we hear them does not show that they semantically express those propositions. The semantically more modest position, that of Radical Invariantism, is that there is nothing variable or shifty in the semantic content of a bare EP sentence. What is variable is how the sentence can be used or how an utterance of it can be taken, with its semantically invariant but propositionally incomplete content completed by the addition of a perspective, thereby turning a propositional radical into a proposition. Rather than appeal to supposedly semantic intuitions, proponents of Contextualism need to provide some linguistic basis for claiming that bare EP sentences contain variables that get assigned values by certain features of the context of utterance (or else are quantified over by being in the scope of some suitable quantifier phrase).
Lacking evidence for this supposition, we should adopt the default hypothesis that there are no such variables.
36 I discuss the error of putting too much credence in seemingly semantic intuitions, e.g. by mistaking pragmatic regularities for matters of semantic fact, in Bach 2002 and 2005: 29-33. Contextualism must also confront what I'll call the uniqueness problem. That is, it needs to be formulated in a way that works for the variety of ways in which bare EP sentences can be used, as illustrated in sections 5 and 6. The relevant perspective generally includes the speaker's, but in many cases it extends beyond that, beyond even the joint perspective of the speaker and hearer. In order to come up with a unitary account, the contextualist can try to extend the reach of the relevant group but, as John
MacFarlane points out, "there is no way to keep the group from expanding indefinitely" (this volume: 30ms). 37 Besides, as some of our examples illustrated, the perspective that figures into the proposition allegedly expressed by the bare EP sentence sometimes does not include the speaker's. The relevant one might be the hearer's perspective, a group perspective that includes the hearer's but not the speaker's, or some third party's or separate group's perspective. And it won't do for the contextualist to offer an ad hoc story about which perspective counts as the relevant one in a given case. Nor can the contextualist just summarily claim that in each case the context somehow "determines" which perspective is the relevant one. Which one it is must be a determinate function of some specified contextual parameter. And it would be facile to try to solve the uniqueness problem by claiming that the operative parameter is appropriateness, salience, or the like. That would be a flimsy attempt to sweep a semantic problem under the pragmatic rug.
Invoking the speaker's intention does not help here. 38 That would effectively concede that context plays merely a pragmatic role, not a semantic one. For once we invoke the speaker's intention, we can no longer claim that context itself determines which 37 As MacFarlane explains, "The problem is that once we let data about third-party assessments and retraction motivate an expansion of the contextually relevant group to include more than just the speaker, there is no way to stop this machine. The same kind of arguments that motivate expanding the relevant group of knowers to include [the eavesdropper] would motivate expanding the relevant group of knowers to include anybody who will ever consider the claim" (this volume: 12ms). "There [does not] seem to be any stable position that balances these two competing desiderata. If we focus on uptake (third-party assessments, retractions, and disagreement), we are led to expand the relevant body of knowledge, seemingly without end. But if we focus on production, we are led to contract it (on pain of making ordinary, apparently reasonable assertions unwarranted). We are led to a kind of paradox: although the truth of a claim made using epistemic modals must depend somehow on what is known -that is what makes it "epistemic" -it does not seem to depend on any particular body of knowledge" (19-20ms with Relativism that the semantic contents of bare EP sentences do not vary. I take Radical Invariantism to be the default position on the semantics of bare EP sentences, but that doesn't mean it isn't subject to objections. I will take up the best ones I can think of.
The first charges that Radical Invariantism is nothing more than a version of Contextualism, and the others allege that Radical Invariantism implies something false about the claims we make and thoughts we express when we use bare EP sentences.
i. Radical Invariantism is just a version of Contextualism.
People often complain to me that Radical Invariantism is just a version of Contextualism Utterances are speech acts, the subject matter of pragmatics, not semantics.
ii. Radical Invariantism gets the phenomenology wrong.
It might be objected on phenomenological grounds that, despite arguments to the contrary but in accordance with appearances, bare EP sentences really do express propositions.
This objection is based on the observation that when we entertain, accept, or reject a possibility, we do not seem to do so relative to a perspective. The short answer to this objection is that appearances can be deceiving, in particular about the structure of propositions about epistemic possibilities. Consider other cases, involving predicates like 'offensive', 'scary', and 'obvious'. People can use them in simple sentences to say things and express attitudes that they take to be absolute, not relational. However, it does not follow that the relevant facts are absolute rather than relational. If they are relational, as presumably they are, then it is plausible that these facts are captured only by perspective-involving propositions (in a broad sense of 'perspective').
I suppose that one could concede this reply, so far as it goes, but argue that even though there are no bare epistemic possibility facts (because of the perspective relativity of epistemic possibility), people can still have beliefs and make claims about epistemic possibilities that are not relativized. This would be analogous to the suggestion that people believe things and make claims about motion or weight without realizing that motion and weight are relative (to frame of reference and gravitational field, respectively). However, implementing this suggestion would require adopting a strong error theory about people's ordinary epistemic possibility beliefs and claims. Such a theory seems relatively plausible regarding beliefs and claims about motion and weight, but it is much less plausible regarding beliefs and claims about offensiveness, scariness, or obviousness -or epistemic possibility, whose relativity seems, well, obvious.
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40 Boghossian (2006) and Wright (forthcoming) insightfully examine this and related issues that arise from different versions of theses that certain ostensibly monadic properties are actually relational.
iii. Radical Invariantism mischaracterizes the mental representation of EP propositions.
This objection is similar to the previous one, but it concerns the representation of EP In this connection it is plausible to suppose that by default we represent epistemic possibilities from our own current cognitive perspective. Epistemic possibilities are, we might say, default-egocentric. That is, we consider them from our own current perspective unless we are prompted to consider them from a different perspective. It is only when some other perspective comes into play that we explicitly consider the possibility relative to a perspective (we can't view it from that perspective since we do not occupy that perspective). Only when the relevant perspective is different from our own current one does the perspective have to be represented. When considering or even temporarily adopting a different perspective, we must represent a possibility as relative to that perspective. So, for example, if you believe that your grandfather thought it possible that the world was created in 4004 BC, you take it that he thought this relative to the body of information he had. The situation is analogous to believing that a certain object in another person's field of vision is at a certain distance and direction from them.
iv. Radical Invariantism "overgenerates".
The worry here is that by keeping perspectives out of the semantics of bare EP sentences, Radical Invariantism imposes no constraint on what speakers can mean in uttering such sentences. It allows that a speaker could utter 'I might be a spy', knowing full well that he is not a spy, but mean that from Dick Cheney's perspective the speaker might be a spy.
It is true that Radical Invariantism, as a thesis about the semantics of bare EP sentences, imposes no such constraint. That is the job of a pragmatic account of how such sentences can reasonably be used or plausibly be understood to convey more than they express semantically. Such an account begins with the observation that there is a general, rational constraint on speakers' communicative intentions, namely that they be recognizable by the intended audience. A speaker cannot utter a sentence and rationally mean anything he pleases. He must mean something that he can reasonably expect to be taken as meaning. In the case of bare EP sentences, there must be a unique candidate that the audience can identify as the relevant perspective. Otherwise, there would be no determinate way of taking the utterance, in which case the speaker would need to make the relevant perspective explicit. As we saw in discussing various cases, the uses of an unembedded bare EP sentence often involves the joint perspective of the interlocutors, not a third party's. There has to be some evident reason for the hearer to suppose that the relevant perspective is one that does not include the speaker's and it needs to be evident whose perspective that is. We saw cases, namely Suggesting a Possibility and Asking about a Possibility, where the relevant perspective is the hearer's. And, as we saw with cases in which a third party's attitude is being reported or action is being explained, normally it is that person's perspective that comes into play. In such cases the focus is not on the possibility itself but on the person's attitude or action.
In my view there is no semantic account to be had of how perspectives enter into the uses of bare EP sentences, in either of the ways suggested by contextualists and relativists. There is also no need for such an account. In denying that perspectives enter into the semantic contents of these sentences. I am not denying the need for a pragmatic account of the ways in which speakers can reasonably intend and expect utterances of bare EP sentences to be taken and the ways in which such utterances can reasonably be taken (see the Appendix for some general conjectures in this regard). This is a matter of accounting for which perspective comes into play in a given case even though it is not mentioned. In some cases no unique perspective comes into play, and interlocutors talk past each other. In those cases, as well as in those in which the intended perspective is not the one that would be uniquely salient if none were mentioned, the speaker needs to make explicit what the intended perspective is. 
The Bottom Line
It is agreed on all sides that a state of affairs is or is not epistemically possible only relative to a perspective, a body of information. Epistemic possibility sentences that mention perspectives (or persons with perspectives) semantically express propositions that include perspectives (or persons) as constituents. These are classical propositions, can plausibly them to mean) in uttering these sentences. The problem is to not to give a semantic account of the propositional contents of bare EP sentences but to explain pragmatically how we can use or understand uses of them to convey a proposition involving a certain perspective. Usually the perspective is or includes the speaker's, but not always, especially when the bare EP sentence is embedded. In some cases, in order to forestall misunderstanding or incomprehension, we need to make the relevant perspective explicit and must use a relativized epistemic possibility sentence. But we generally know when using a bare epistemic possibility sentence will do, in which case we do not bother mentioning the relevant perspective. Just what this ability involves is something for us as theorists to figure out, but as speakers we have already mastered it pretty well.
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42 Similarly, it is a metaphysical fact that tastiness, offensiveness, boringness, and amusingness are perspective-relative. This is not a semantic fact about 'is tasty', 'is offensive', 'is boring', or 'is amusing'. Rather, it is a metaphysical fact about the things they semantically express, that these things are relations, not properties. Predictably enough, I develop a radical invariantist account of unrelativized sentences containing so-called predicates of personal taste in a companion piece called "Relatively Speaking." 43 I am grateful to an anonymous OUP referee and to the not so anonymous editors for their valuable comments. Thanks also to audiences at the universities of California at Davis, California at Santa Cruz, Chicago, Edinburgh, London (Institute of Philosophy), St. Andrews, Sheffield, and Wisconsin-Milwaukee, where many of the ideas in this paper were presented.
Appendix: Possibilities and Pragmatics
Here is a series of observations about the pragmatics of utterances of bare EP sentences.
To avoid being tendentious I frame them in as theory-neutral a way as possible. So, for example, when I speak of asserting a possibility, I leave open whether or not the asserted proposition involves a perspective. Space does not permit explaining, illustrating, or justifying these observations in any detail, but they mostly apply basic platitudes in pragmatics to the special case of utterances about epistemic possibilities.
• When you use a bare EP sentence assertively, ordinarily you do not assert a mere or idle possibility. If it is worth mentioning, presumably you take it to be a more serious possibility than that and intend it to be taken as such.
• In asserting that p ('' means 'it is epistemically possible that'), sometimes you are not so much committing yourself to its being true as refraining from committing yourself to the falsity of its core proposition p.
• Often the point of asserting that p is not to inform your audience that p or to get them to believe it but, rather, to call it to their attention or, if it is obvious that they already believe that p, to remind them of it.
• When you assert a possibility, you often do something more than just assert it.
Depending on the circumstances, you might be suggesting that it is worth looking into, challenging a claim (a knowledge claim, say), or even advising somebody not to do something because of the risk associated with the possibility.
• You can utter an unembedded bare EP sentence without asserting that p. You could instead be suggesting that p or even just guessing that p, especially if you use 'perhaps' or 'maybe' rather than 'might' or 'possibly'. In that case, you would be using the term not as a content modifier but as an utterance modifier, to indicate something about what you are doing in uttering the rest of the sentence.
• When you assert that p, normally you leave open that ~p as well. For if you were foreclosing that possibility, you would be prepared to deny that ~p, hence to assert that p, in which case it would be misleading to assert the weaker p. Similarly, if you were considering an exhaustive list of possible answers to a wh-question and ruled out all but A, you would not merely say that A is a very strong possibility. You would conclude (by elimination) is that the answer must be A.
• When you sincerely assert that p, often you do not expect your audience's knowledge and beliefs exclude that possibility. In that case, you implicitly assume that if you knew what they know and believed what they believe, you could still coherently believe and assert that p. So your assertion implicitly incorporates their perspective into your own. You intend the possibility that p to be compatible with your joint perspective.
• On some occasions, however, your audience believes something that if true would rule out the possibility in question. In that case, your assertion that p, which leaves open that ~p (as observed above), cannot coherently incorporate their perspective.
• In some cases of using an unembedded bare EP sentence, the fact that a state of affairs is compatible with one's current perspective is not at issue. Suppose you say, for example, "I have no idea whether p," and go on to say you are going to look into the matter or proceed to ask your audience whether p. Obviously it is already possible for you that p. However, that does not keep you from inquiring into it, since what you are interested in is whether p from a more informed perspective.
• When you use a relativized EP sentence rather than a bare one, not only do you make explicit what the relevant perspective is but also, by explicitly mentioning it, you make it the focus. Typically what is then at issue is not whether the mentioned state of affairs is possible -you and your audience may think it is not -but something else, such as what the person with that perspective hoped for or feared or perhaps why the person did a certain thing. Or the point of the assertion may be to call attention to the person's overlooking or disregarding a certain possibility.
• Not mentioning a perspective is a way of keeping the question of the possibility in focus and, moreover, of hedging the question as to whose/which perspective is at issue. This allows for retreating from a joint perspective or distancing yourself from your earlier perspective. In this way you can avoid being overly committed without being too guarded. It allows for either deferring to your interlocutor or sticking to your guns, depending on whether or not you are prepared to let your own perspective be trumped.
